Abstract-This paper develops parametric methods to detect network anomalies using only aggregate traffic statistics, in contrast to other works requiring flow separation, even when the anomaly is a small fraction of the total traffic. By adopting simple statistical models for anomalous and background traffic in the time domain, one can estimate model parameters in real time, thus obviating the need for a long training phase or manual parameter tuning. The proposed bivariate parametric detection mechanism (bPDM) uses a sequential probability ratio test, allowing for control over the false positive rate while examining the tradeoff between detection time and the strength of an anomaly. Additionally, it uses both traffic-rate and packet-size statistics, yielding a bivariate model that eliminates most false positives. The method is analyzed using the bit-rate signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) metric, which is shown to be an effective metric for anomaly detection. The performance of the bPDM is evaluated in three ways. First, synthetically generated traffic provides for a controlled comparison of detection time as a function of the anomalous level of traffic. Second, the approach is shown to be able to detect controlled artificial attacks over the University of Southern California (USC), Los Angeles, campus network in varying real traffic mixes. Third, the proposed algorithm achieves rapid detection of real denial-of-service attacks as determined by the replay of previously captured network traces. The method developed in this paper is able to detect all attacks in these scenarios in a few seconds or less.
as an anomaly. Our anomaly detection problem is posed as a statistical hypothesis test. We develop parametric statistical models for typical and anomalous traffic. Our detection method does not need, or attempt, to model the full traffic patterns. Instead, it captures key, gross features of the traffic to enable informed decisions about changes in traffic. We underscore that our model does not capture all aspects of general Internet traffic. However, we show that, in spite of this known mismatch, our model effectively captures changes in the traffic that are associated with network anomalies. Our goal is to see whether these simple, approximate statistical models can yield detection methods of high performance by modeling sufficient, salient features of the traffic.
Our approach has three key features. First, our model for anomaly detection operates on aggregate traffic, without flow separation or deep-packet inspection. Both of these characteristics are essential for a practical and deployable anomaly detection system. Flow separation, per-flow anomaly detection, and deep-packet inspection are difficult or impossible for most backbone routers, which have tens to hundreds of thousands of active flows per minute [8] . Since our approach only considers packet headers and timing information, it is robust to traffic concealment via encryption or tunneling. While it is true that the source and destination IP addresses of each packet are always available at the routers, port numbers are not available without flow separation. Some prior work [20] , [23] uses features related to the source and destination port numbers and so will not be able to detect anomalies in aggregate or VPN tunneled traffic. Note that operating on aggregate traffic is sufficient to detect anomalies; we assume that responses such as filtering can involve heavier weight, per-flow analysis.
Second, unlike prior anomaly detection approaches, our method automates training and does not require hand-tuned or hard-coded parameters. Instead, key algorithmic parameters are automatically calculated based on the underlying model parameters, or estimates thereof, which evolve as a function of network traffic. For instance, the update window size, an algorithmic parameter that is described in Section IV, is computed based on the average sample number (ASN) function. The latter is a function of the underlying model parameters and is derived in [34, Appendix C] . Our automation significantly eases deployment and operation in networks where traffic and anomalies inevitably evolve over time.
Third, we employ both the packet rate and the sample entropy of the packet-size distribution statistics to ensure robustness against false positives, thus overcoming one of the traditional drawbacks of anomaly detection methods. Combining both these features ensures that the detection of an anomaly is declared only when an increase in the traffic volume is accompanied by a change in the packet-size distribution. Thus, an increase in the background traffic alone will usually not be misidentified as an anomaly. We show that our proposed detection method successfully detects attacks with these features. Several real-world network phenomena have these features: all rate-based DoS attacks, including TCP SYN attacks, ping attacks, and service request attacks that use fixed-sized requests and act upon DNS or Web servers. Since an adversary may try to conceal fixed-size requests, we show that attacks from a smart attacker that attempts to vary request size (Section V-E) are also successfully detected by the bivariate parametric detection mechanism (bPDM). Finally, since the bPDM ignores packet addresses and contents, it can detect attacks with spoofed source addresses and attacks in virtual private networks or with encrypted traffic in the common case that encryption does not systematically alter packet sizes.
The contribution of our paper is to develop the bPDM, which is completely passive, incurs no additional network overhead, and operates on aggregate traffic. Furthermore, this work suggests it is feasible to detect anomalies and attacks based on aggregate traffic at network edges, and not just near attack victims. Our detection method employs the sequential probability ratio test (SPRT) [38] , a time-adaptive detection technique, for the two aggregate traffic features we consider: packet rate and packet size. Combining the SPRTs for these two features ensures the bPDM is robust against false positives, yet maintains rapid detection capabilities. We validate the bPDM and quantify the method's effectiveness on controlled synthetic traces, emulated Iperf attacks, and real network attacks. We introduce the bit-rate signal-to-noise ratio (SNR), which is found to be an effective metric for evaluation and superior to the previously proposed packet SNR metric [16] . Our algorithm also performs comparably to or better than a selected set of existing detection schemes, while mitigating key drawbacks via the features described above.
II. RELATED WORK
In this section, we review the prior art in anomaly and attack detection relevant to our work. The methods described can be broadly classified as techniques requiring flow separation, spectral or frequency-domain methods, and nonparametric changepoint methods.
Methods Requiring Flow Separation: The techniques in [13] , [15] , [18] , [23] , [24] , [26] , [28] , [30] , [37] and [39] use certain flow-separated traffic parameters, e.g., source and destination IP addresses and port numbers, to detect an attack. Flow-separated parameters are also employed for fast portscan detection [20] , which uses an SPRT to develop an online detection algorithm.
These methods use header information and flow-separated features to detect anomalies and attacks, and in comparison to methods that classify outliers based only on traffic volume [32] , [33] , are far more accurate while also yielding a lower probability of false positives. On the other hand, the main disadvantages of flow separation are its inherent complexity at the router and its inability to process encrypted traffic. Our work operates on aggregate traffic, using the traffic volume (specifically, the packet rate) to detect attacks, with the improvement that incorporation of the entropy of the packet size, which does not require flow separation, reduces the probability of false positives and allows us to discriminate between true attacks and nonmalicious changes in traffic.
Nonparametric Methods: This class of methods does not assume an underlying model, but rather tailors its detection mechanism to the data. A variety of nonparametric methods employ CUSUM to implement change-point detection. The CUSUM algorithm [7] involves the calculation of a cumulative sum of the weighted observations. When this sum exceeds a certain threshold value, a change in value is declared. Prior work has focused on detecting SYN attacks using both aggregate traffic [32] and flow-separated traffic [39] . The work of [35] focuses on anomaly detection using features and statistics of the IP layer. Kalman filtering to detect anomalies using IP address filtered traffic is considered in [29] . A key drawback of the CUSUM algorithm is that the intensity of the anomaly needs to be known a priori; in most cases, the solution to this problem requires empirically designed thresholds that necessitate significant human effort before the scheme is initially deployed. In contrast, our detection mechanism automatically calculates key algorithmic parameters based on the underlying model.
Spectral Methods: Spectral techniques have been widely used in many other fields to distinguish hidden patterns and trends from a noisy background. In the past few years, researchers have begun to apply these methods to analyze network traffic. Spectrum-based approaches have been used to detect features with near-periodic signatures, such as bottlenecks in the link layer, the effects of the TCP windowing mechanism and DoS attacks [16] , and traffic anomalies [6] . They have also been employed for attack fingerprinting [17] . The work in [9] used the energy spectrum to distinguish between reduction-of-quality flows and legitimate TCP flows in a distributed setting, and using the sequential SPRT framework. However, the detection accuracy of spectral methods degrades as the periodicities in the attack weaken, and most methods are more computationally expensive than corresponding time-domain techniques, especially when high-speed aggregate traffic must be analyzed.
Our previous work [33] developed the parametric Modeled Attack Detector (MAD), which employed Poisson and shifted Poisson models that could rapidly detect low-rate attacks, but required a dedicated training phase to learn the background traffic parameters, and which was susceptible to a few false positives. Furthermore, the one-parameter Poisson model did not allow for continuous updating of the background parameters and suffered from overdispersion and underdispersion, given real network data. The bPDM discussed in this paper employs richer models that circumvent the need for a training phase. Combining the packet-rate and packet-size distributions nearly eliminates false positives. We present the bPDM in Section IV, but first provide an overview of sequential detection, which is the underlying framework of our anomaly detection method.
III. BACKGROUND IN SEQUENTIAL DETECTION METHODS
Hypothesis testing exploits prior knowledge of statistical descriptions of data in order to decide among a set of candidate populations [22] . In our problem setup, we have two hypotheses
No anomaly
Presence of anm anomaly in traffic
The conditional probability density when hypothesis is true is denoted for , 1. We assume independent and identically distributed observations , which are drawn from one of the two probability distributions.
Given the two hypotheses and thus two decision choices, there are four possible scenarios, of which we focus on two. A false positive (FP), or false alarm, is declared when the algorithm selects when is in fact true; choosing even though is true is termed a false negative (FN). The probabilities of these two scenarios (1) are used to specify the performance criterion of the sequential detection test. The bPDM employs the SPRT [38] in order to quickly detect an attack.
The likelihood ratio is used to implement the SPRT. Given independent and identically distributed observations , the likelihood ratio is defined as (2) where the second equality illustrates that the likelihood ratio can be easily updated given a new observation.
Given a new observation, the likelihood ratio is compared to two thresholds and , which correspond to choosing or , respectively. Fig. 1 depicts a realization of the SPRT wherein if , the sequential test continues, and an additional observation is taken as is the case with in Fig. 1 . However, if or , then the test terminates, and we choose hypothesis if the former, or hypothesis if the latter, is true. In Fig. 1 , we see that , and thus is chosen; then, the sequential test and likelihood ratio are reset since an anomaly was not detected, and the SPRT continues. When the likelihood ratio crosses either threshold, at say sample , the sequential test is reset by computing the updated likelihood ratio as instead of . We then see that , so is chosen, indicating that an anomaly has been detected. We can either stop the test now (as shown in Fig. 1 ), or reset the SPRT and see whether the likelihood ratio crosses threshold again, potentially confirming the presence of an anomaly. This latter methodology is employed in the design of our detection mechanism, detailed in Section IV.
Ideally, the boundaries and are selected to minimize the probability of error for all possible values of ; however, this formulation of the problem is generally intractable, and thus we use Wald's approximations [38] to approximate (3) which are functions of the required detection performance parameters from (1) . We observe that the approximate values of and are independent of . The number of samples required for a particular test to make a decision is a random number. Thus, we examine the average value of this random number, referred to as the ASN function, to measure the efficacy of the SPRT. For the binary hypothesis test, the ASN function is denoted for hypothesis and is derived for our models in [34, Appendix C].
IV. PARAMETRIC MODEL
In this section, we derive the SPRTs for the packet-rate and packet-size features that are the primary components of the bPDM. The bPDM operates on a unidirectional sampled time-series of aggregate network traffic. The parametric models employed to derive the bPDM are not representative of general Internet traffic, but rather are chosen to differentiate between the presence-of-anomaly and background-only hypotheses.
A classical SPRT assumes known and constant model parameters. In reality, such parameter values are not always available, and thus we consider a generalized likelihood ratio test (GLRT) [36] , defined as (4) where we use the notation to denote replacing the true values of the model parameters of the conditional probability density with their maximum likelihood (ML) estimates . To form the generalized SPRT, the estimated parameters are substituted into the test form as previously described. In particular, we continue taking observations if , and make a decision, choosing or if or , respectively. When implementing the GLRT, the model parameters associated with either or both densities may be estimated. We adopt the notation to denote the estimate of the parameter when is true. Herein, for both the presence-of-anomaly and background-only hypotheses, the respective model parameters are estimated using the observations in the SPRTs for both our features.
In particular, the model parameters are updated using nonoverlapping windows. We initially use fixed-size windows for both hypotheses; a 1-s sliding window ensures that enough data is being collected to derive good estimates of the background and attack parameters, denoted s. The offset window employed to estimate the parameters uses more recent samples, and thus the change in the model parameters can be detected as evidenced in Section V. Whenever the SPRT crosses the lower threshold, confirming the absence of an attack, the ASN function (see [34, Appendix C]) is computed under hypothesis , and the update window size is reset to (5) Similarly, when an attack is detected by the bPDM, the length of the update window for the parameters is reset to (6) where the first argument of the min functions in (5) and (6) are the ASN functions under hypotheses and , respectively, and have been derived in [34, Appendix C] . We now derive the SPRTs for both the packet-rate and packet-size features, and then describe the bPDM algorithm.
A. SPRT for the Packet Rate
The null hypothesis , which represents only background traffic, is modeled using the generalized Poisson distribution (GPD), whose probability density function (pdf) is given by (7) where is the number of packet arrivals in a fixed time interval and are the parameters of the GPD. We model an anomaly or attack stream as a constant-rate source with deterministic, unknown rate . Our work focuses on detecting a set of commonly occurring attacks, which is a class of attacks such as DoS attacks that use fixed-size attack packets [14] . Since DoS attacks are also characterized by the attacker flooding the network, this set of attacks corresponds to the constant-rate attack traffic assumption made above. However, as evidenced in Section V-E, the bPDM can also quickly and accurately detect smart attacks which employing varying packet sizes. A random variable drawn from the anomalous distribution is specified as (8) where is drawn from the GPD distribution that models the background-only hypothesis. For the anomaly hypothesis, we assume that the constant-rate anomaly follows the pdf of the shifted GPD (sGPD) 1 given by (9) where is the number of packet arrivals in a fixed time interval and are the parameters of the sGPD. Note that in the case where an anomaly is present, is the minimum number of packet arrivals in a fixed time interval. For the packet-rate SPRT, under both the GPD and sGPD, is thus the number of packet arrivals in the interval , given the sampling rate .
The SPRT, in the case of the packet-rate feature, requires us to compare the generalized likelihood ratio (10) to the threshold given in (3). Note that the densities specified in (10) are the GPD (7) and sGPD (9) with parameter estimates used in lieu of known parameter values. We now derive the estimator structures for the parameters of the GPD and sGPD for the background-only and presence-of-anomaly hypotheses, respectively.
The mean and variance of the GPD are given as [10] ( 11) and are used to derive the moment estimators of the parameters and under the hypothesis, which are given as [10] (12)
where and are the sample mean and sample variance, respectively, of an -sample window. We note that the sample mean and sample variance are computed using their unbiased estimators 2 given by (13) respectively. Although both moment and ML estimators are available (see [10] for the ML estimators) in the case of the null hypothesis, we use the former since they are more computationally efficient than the latter.
For the sGPD, the moment estimators of the three model parameters require computing third-and fourth-order moments, which we observed to required an order of magnitude greater number of samples to compute than the average time to detection. Thus, we present an alternative, computationally lightweight estimation procedure for the model parameters under the hypothesis. From the construction of our anomaly model in (8), we would expect that an unbiased estimate of can be obtained by simply using the difference in the average traffic levels in the anomalous and background-only cases. Furthermore, since we are deriving moment estimators in a SPRT framework, we employ the estimator (14) where and are as defined in (12) . The estimate is computed using both the -sample sliding window and the -sample growing window. Since is a generalized-Poisson-distributed random variable, the other two sGPD model parameters are estimated using the GPD estimator structures in (12) and are given as (15) where is the estimate given in (14) , and and are computed via (13) using the -sample sliding window. Note that the function in (14) is a constraint due to the fact that the support of the sGPD is over . We further note that the derived estimators provide accurate estimates of the sGPD parameters and are consistent 3 (refer to [34, Appendix D] ). Employing the GPD/sGPD hypothesis test lets us detect a change in the mean of the traffic, but an increase in the mean does not always occur due to a malicious anomaly or attack. Flash crowds, which might occur due to the Digg or SlashDot effect, are not malicious traffic [19] , but would be tagged as anomalous.
B. Incorporating the Packet-Size SPRT
The packet-size distribution of normal Internet traffic has been characterized in [27] as mostly bimodal at 40 and 1500 bytes (with 40% and 20% of packets, respectively). An examination of our background trace data, which include Ethernet and VLAN headers, validates this model but with differing means. The background traffic in our traces can also be characterized as mostly bimodal, with means at 68 and 1518 bytes, which represent approximately 40% and 20% of the total packets, respectively. We note, however, that no specific distribution is ascertained for the remaining 40% of the packets.
We expect packet-size distribution information to be effective in attack detection since a broad class of attacks use a single packet size; e.g., DNS reflector attacks use the maximum packet size, and TCP SYN attacks use the minimum packet size. Thus, the influx of attack packets, in the case of attacks that employ a single attack packet size, will alter the relative number of a specific packet size with respect to the packet-size distribution of normal traffic. As such, the sample entropy of the packet-size distribution can be used to distinguish between the backgroundonly and presence-of-anomaly hypotheses.
In the bPDM framework, recall that represents the number of packet arrivals in the interval . Let denote the set of distinct packet sizes that arrive in this interval, and denote the proportion of packets of size to the total number of packets in the same interval. Thus, the sample entropy is computed as (16) The sample entropy is modeled using the Gaussian distribution given by (17) for both the background and attack hypotheses. Thus, the log-likelihood ratio (LLR), given observations, is specified as (18) where , , and . As in the case of the GPD/sGPD hypothesis test, the model parameters in the case of the sample entropy are estimated in real time using the sliding and growing update windows. Since the sample entropy is modeled using the Gaussian distribution, the parameter estimators for and for each of the hypotheses are the sample mean and sample variance , given in (13), using the respective update windows. The resulting SPRT requires that we continue to take more observations if (19) where is the generalized likelihood ratio associated with the packet-size SPRT.
is of the form in (18) , but the constants , , and are defined in terms of the parameter estimates and instead of the true parameter values.
Given two features, ideally we would compute a joint density to determine a single bivariate SPRT. However, given the mixed nature of the two features (discrete packet arrivals and continuous entropies) computing this joint density appears to be intractable. Instead, we now describe our bPDM algorithm, which effectively combines the two SPRTs to yield an anomaly detection mechanism that has a low probability of false positives.
C. bPDM Algorithm
The bPDM combines the SPRTs of the packet-rate and packet-size features. Before we present the bPDM implementation details, we first consider a pedagogical example that shows that a fixed-size DoS attack can be successfully detected by the bPDM, which combines both the packet-rate and packet-size features. Given the bimodal characterization of packet sizes [27] , assume that normal background-only traffic has a packet-size distribution given by 40% 68-byte packets 20% 1518-byte packets 40% other packets We further assume that the DoS attack, which uses 1518-byte packets, increases the percentage of 1518-byte packets from 20% to 40%. Assuming that the background-only traffic consists of 100 packets, we can calculate that the attack consists of 33 packets, which result in the increased proportion of 1518-byte packets. We can now compute the post-attack distribution of packet sizes as 30% 68-byte packets 40% 1518-byte packets 30% other packets Thus, we see that volume-based, fixed-size DoS attacks can be successfully detected by the bPDM since the attack alters both the packet-rate and packet-size distributions.
For the implementation of the bPDM, we first recall that the bPDM must be initially deployed in the absence of an anomaly. Once the initial parameter estimates have been computed, subsequent observations are used to update the parameter estimates for both hypotheses and compute the likelihood ratios. For each of the SPRTs, the likelihood ratio is updated given each new observation as described in (2) . The continuous updating of the likelihood ratio and the and parameters, estimated using a fixed number of samples, obviates the necessity of a priori knowledge of the background or baseline parameters. During the operation of the bPDM, if only one of the SPRTs (packet-rate or packet-size) crosses the upper threshold , then we declare an initial warning and continue computing the likelihood ratio after resetting the corresponding SPRT. For example, an increase in the packet rate without a significant change in the sample entropy of the packet-size distribution may be due to a normal nonmalicious increase in traffic. Thus, an attack is declared only if an initial warning is followed by the other SPRT crossing the upper threshold; i.e., we declare an attack only if both the packet-rate and packet-size SPRTs "coincidentally" cross the upper threshold. Requiring the SPRTs to cross the upper threshold at the same sample is too restrictive, being the equivalent of millisecond accuracy; thus, we define the "hold time," s, and require that the SPRTs cross the upper threshold within samples of each other. Consequently, a false positive is said to have occurred when both SPRTs coincidentally cross the upper threshold and there is no anomaly present in the traffic. The salient features of bPDM operation are highlighted in Fig. 2 , and pseudocode for the algorithm can be found in our technical report [34] . In contrast to the bPDM operation described, the packet rate could also be used individually to detect anomalies. However, this would result in a significant number of false positives being declared since most legitimate increases in traffic would be flagged as attacks.
D. Example and Generalization
In order to highlight the facets of the bPDM, we consider the detection of a simulated Iperf attack with bit-rate SNR 4 0.056 using our detection mechanism. Fig. 3 shows the SPRT outputs that result from detecting this Iperf attack. We declare the presence of an attack 695 ms after the start of the attack, although the packet-size SPRT crosses the upper threshold before this point in time. The delay is due to the fact that the bPDM requires that both SPRTs coincidentally cross the upper threshold. Although it is the case that the time to detection could have been reduced had we used only the packet-rate SPRT in the case of Fig. 3 , it would have yielded a false positive in the case of Fig. 4 . Therein, we find that the crossing of the upper threshold before the start of the attack is flagged as a warning, but an attack is not declared. Thus, the bPDM reduces false positives by leveraging both the packet-rate and packet-size features of aggregate traffic.
An advantage of anomaly detection based on aggregate packet rates and sizes, instead of contents, is that it is robust to encryption. A DoS attack with encrypted traffic will show the same rate of change in packet sizes as during a DoS attack. These results assume that encryption is packet-length preserving (as is typical for nearly all network encryption schemes). While our extensions that consider packet size would be ineffective for encryption that performed traffic obfuscation and bundling, our rate-based methods apply even there.
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION AND ANALYSIS
In the following sections, we employ three sets of synthetic traces, six real and proxy-real network attacks, and 67 emulated Iperf attacks in varying traffic mixes to investigate the effects of background and attack traffic levels on the time to detection. We show that the performance of the bPDM is comparable to or better than selected alternate detection schemes (Section V-C), and that time to detection is influenced by bit-rate SNR. We define bit-rate SNR in Section V-A, and show how it is affected by attack rate and hop counts in Sections V-B and V-H, respectively. We also compare it to the previously used packet SNR metric (Section V-F). Finally, we validate our synthetic attacks (Section V-G) and demonstrate that the bPDM works with minimal training (Section V-D), is robust to countermeasures (Section V-E), and has a controllable probability of false positives (Section V-I).
A. Evaluation of the bPDM
The basic principles of detection theory teach that the time to detection for a signal in noise is related to the SNR [36] . However, for anomaly detection, there is no clear notion of what an appropriate SNR measure would be. We present the bit-rate SNR metric, which is defined as (20) where is the set of attack packet sizes, is the set of background packet sizes, and is the number of packets of size bits. In this section, we evaluate the bPDM using a set of synthetic traces and emulated Iperf attacks, and find that as the bit-rate SNR increases, the time to detection decreases. This trend is also shown to be true for the underlying theoretical model of the bPDM.
1) Evaluation Using Simulated Synthetic Traces:
The bPDM is first evaluated using a set of synthetic attacks [5] that allow us to control the attack rate and methodically evaluate the bPDM. The attack traces use 196 megabits per second (Mb/s) background traffic taken from our network. After 6-8 s of background traffic, we add in constant-rate attacks at various rates using Stream Merger [21] . Focusing on low-rate attacks, our traces employ attacks that range from 1 to 120 Mb/s, in addition to the 196-Mb/s background traffic. The artificial attacks model TCP SYN attacks that use a fixed-size attack packet of 68 bytes [8] . Fig. 5 plots the bPDM times to detection for the set of synthetic TCP SYN attacks as a function of the bit-rate SNR, in addition to the detection times for emulated attacks and the theoretical model discussed in following sections.
The bPDM was run on eight distinct synthetic traces of a specific bit-rate SNR, and the mean values of the detection times are plotted in Fig. 5 along with error bars that represent the standard deviation associated with the mean detection time. We see that as the bit-rate SNR increases, the bPDM time to detection for the synthetic attacks decreases.
2) Evaluation Using Emulated Iperf Traces: We next consider a more realistic scenario wherein controlled attacks in varying traffic mixes are detected by our algorithm. Specifically, we employ 80-s Iperf attacks that use 345-byte fixedsize packets sent from Colorado State University (CSU), Fort Collins, to the University of Southern California (USC), Los Angeles; their generation is detailed in [34, Appendix A]. As before, as the bit-rate SNR increases, the time to detection for these emulated Iperf attacks decreases.
The detection times for the 67 individual Iperf attacks are plotted as open symbols in Fig. 5 . The individual attacks are grouped by bit-rate SNR to allow us to investigate the relationship between detection time and bit-rate SNR. The data is partitioned in 0.015-bin increments, so that 10 bins span the bit-rate SNR range from 0.035 to 0.185. Each bin is plotted using a different symbol in Fig. 5, i. e., data points that have bit-rate SNR values between 0.035 and 0.05 are represented using circles, data with bit-rate SNR values between 0.05 and 0.065 by x's, and so on. The aggregated Iperf line in Fig. 5 plots the mean of each bin, and the error bars give the standard deviation for each bin. We find that the time to detection decreases as the bit-rate SNR increases for these Iperf attacks, as it did for the synthetic attacks. The large error bars of the aggregated Iperf plot prevent further statistical analysis.
As shown in Fig. 5 , there are no detection times that correspond to a bit-rate SNR of less than 0.02 for both the emulated Iperf attacks, as well as the synthetic TCP SYN attacks considered previously. This constitutes a lower limit on the performance of the bPDM, in that if the attack rate is lower than 0.02, then the estimate of the parameter of the shifted generalized Poisson distribution in (14) is zero, and thus the attack is undetectable by the bPDM.
3) Comparing Simulated and Emulated Traces to Theory:
We have found that the bPDM time to detection decreases as the bit-rate SNR increases in the case of both the simulated and emulated attacks. In this section, we show that the time to detection for the underlying theoretical model follows the same general trend. We recall that the SPRT, described in Section III, is employed by the bPDM for both the packet-rate and packet-size features. For the packet-rate SPRT, which is based on the GPD model as in (7) and (9), the theoretical time to detection is the ASN function under hypothesis and is derived in [34, Appendix C]. The ASN under is a function of the sGPD model parameters . The same set of sGPD parameters is used to derive the bit-rate SNR, as defined in (20) . The mean of the GPD is [see (11) ], which corresponds to the number of packets in the background traffic. Similarly, the attack parameter corresponds to the number of attack packets. Furthermore, we assume that the attack uses constant 544-bit packets, and adopt a simplified model for the background traffic wherein 66.6% of packets are 480-bit and 33.3% packets are 12000-bit. Thus, the bit-rate SNR is computed as (21) where for a fixed and , a greater corresponds to a higher bit-rate SNR. The theoretical detection times for and , which correspond to the parameter values for the synthetic TCP SYN attacks and a 30-Mb/s Iperf attack, respectively, are plotted in Fig. 5 as a dashed line and a dotted line, respectively. We see that the theoretical time to detection trends as in the experimental cases: The time to detection decreases as the bitrate SNR increases. In the theoretical case, we find that the detection time is an exponential function of the bit-rate SNR; lower-rate attacks take significantly longer to detect than highrate ones. The theoretical detection times are much lower than the empirical times since there is no notion of cross traffic, or interaction between the packets from the background and attack streams, as experienced in a real router (in the case of the Iperf attacks) or in the Stream-Merger application (in the case of the synthetic TCP SYN attacks). A similar trend is seen in the case of the experimental data, but a rigorous fit cannot be performed due to the small set of averaged data points. Thus, we find that attacks with higher bit-rate SNR values are detected more quickly for the simulated and emulated attacks, which is consistent with what is predicted by the underlying theoretical model.
B. Effect of Attack Rate (Mb/s) on Time to Detection
In the previous section, we saw that the time to detection decreases as the bit-rate SNR increases. The bit-rate SNR as defined in (20) consists of two components: the attack rate (in megabits/second) and the background traffic (in megabits/second). We now investigate the effect of each of the individual components on the time to detection, and find that for a constant level of background traffic, the time to detection decreases as the attack rate increases. The effect of varying background traffic for a constant attack rate is considered in the next section.
As in Section V-A.2, we again aggregate the emulated Iperf data, this time to better examine the effect of the attack rate. Specifically, we group the detection times of emulated attacks by level of background traffic: data points with background traffic of less than 350 Mb/s constitute the first group (low-level), and data points with background traffic greater than 350 Mb/s are the second group (high-level). 5 The detection times of the Iperf attacks, grouped by background traffic level, are plotted as a function of the attack rate (in megabits/second) in Fig. 6 . The attack rates for the data points in Fig. 6 are all at 20, 25, 30, or 40 Mb/s, but are plotted with random shifts Mb/s to improve the visibility of the data points. To measure the association of the time to detection with the attack rate, we compute the Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient [31] of the time to detection and background traffic level, as well as the time to detection and attack strength. The correlation coefficient is independent of the scale of measurement, and its value ranges from 1.00 to 1.00, 6 wherein an value of 0.00 represents no correlation between the two variables, while a value of 1.00 or 1.00 indicates perfect predictability.
For this grouping of the data points, the correlation coefficients between detection time and attack rate (Mb/s) for the high-and low-level background traffic are 0.3050 and 0.0781, respectively. The correlation coefficients and their associated -values, along with the sample size for each group, are listed in Table I . The -value is a measure of statistical significance, i.e., the probability that the result occurred due to chance rather than an underlying cause. A -value of less than 0.10 indicates that there is statistical evidence for the model being considered, or hypothesis being proposed, at the 10% significance level. We see that the detection time and attack rate are weakly negatively correlated with statistical significance for , suggesting that for a specific background level of traffic, the time to detection decreases as the attack rate increases.
Note that this weak negative correlation between time to detection and attack rate also holds in the case of the set of synthetic TCP SYN attacks discussed in Section V-A.1, where the time to detection decreased as the bit-rate SNR increased. This result is intuitive because, in both cases, the effect of attack rate is examined for a given level of background traffic. Interestingly, for a higher level of background traffic , the correlation becomes very weak and loses statistical significance . In order to support the claim that the decrease in correlation is reflective of a legitimate trend, and not merely an artifact, we now consider Table II shows that for the higher-level background traffic, the variance in detection time is greater than in the low-level background traffic case for all the attack rates. Recall that the theoretical cases considered in Section V-A suggest that the time to detection is an exponential function of the bit-rate SNR. This trend can also be seen, but not rigorously verified, for the experimental synthetic and Iperf data. However, the statistical analyses presented herein show that as the level of background traffic increases, the attack rate is less predictive of the time to detection of the bPDM.
C. Comparing bPDM to Prior Methods
We compare the bPDM to a selected set of detection schemes as described in Section II, and find that our algorithm performs comparably to or better than the other detection mechanisms we consider, while mitigating key drawbacks of the latter. Recall that the bPDM only requires 2-3 s of background-only traffic for training, updates its model parameters in real time, and requires no human intervention when it is initially deployed. First, we focus on the MAD [33] , a time-domain sequential scheme that adopts a simpler Poisson model and only uses the packet-rate feature to detect attacks. The MAD requires at least 10-12 s of background-only data to initialize the estimate of its background parameter (the rate), which does not update during the algorithm's operation. Though in the MAD the attack parameter (the rate change due to the attack) is updated in real time, the fact that the background parameter remains static necessitates a longer training phase as compared to the bPDM, which requires 2-3 s of training data. Furthermore, significant evolutions of normal network traffic are often flagged by the MAD as attacks since the background parameter is not automatically updated. In contrast, the bPDM updates its model parameters in an online fashion and employs the packet-size feature to minimize false alarms.
The second scheme we consider is the Periodic Attack Detector (PAD) [33] , a spectral-domain scheme that exploits the near-periodic nature of attacks. The PAD is the sequential version of the spectral-domain scheme developed by He et al. [16] ; i.e., the underlying models and development in [16] were adapted into a sequential framework as described in Section III. Like the MAD, the PAD uses a longer training interval compared to the bPDM and additionally requires that the test data be statistically similar to the training data.
Unlike the bPDM, which develops statistics based only on aggregate traffic features, the entropy-based scheme by Feinstein et al. [15] computes the entropy of flow-separated parameters and compares the decision statistics against a threshold in a sequential framework. We simulate this scheme by computing the entropy of the destination IP address using nonoverlapping batches of 5000 packets, and note that the time to detection for this method, listed in Table III , does not include the time required to extract the flow-separated parameters. We reiterate that the bPDM detects attacks and that flow separation would then be required to filter out the attack. In effect, the proposed approach serves as a very lightweight, early attack detection mechanism. If flow separation is required, the same method used in Feinstein et al. can be used for the bPDM and thus will take the same amount of time. The key difference is that Feinstein's detection method requires a priori flow separation, whereas our method would only invoke flow-separation after attack detection.
We compare the performance of these three schemes to the bPDM using the bit-rate SNR metric. First, we compare the four methods' performance when tested on a reflector attack [4] with a bit-rate SNR of 0.0678, which sends echo reply packets targeting a victim within Los Nettos and lasts for 204 s. The results are tabulated in Table III , where the second and third columns are the number of false positives (# FP) and the time to detection (TD, in milliseconds), respectively. We note that the detection time for the method by Feinstein et al. [15] may be shorter or longer if different simulation parameters are employed. Comparison of the four methods shows that the time to detection for the bPDM is comparable to or shorter than those of the other three.
Next, we employ the set of synthetic TCP SYN attacks to compare the MAD and PAD detection schemes to the bPDM. Fig. 7 shows the detection time as a function of the bit-rate SNR for the bPDM, MAD, and PAD schemes. The IP entropy scheme [15] is not included in the comparison because the synthetic attacks were generated without source and destination IP addresses and port numbers. The label "bPDM(SYN)" denotes the performance of the bPDM on the set of synthetic TCP SYN attacks, and similarly for MAD and PAD. Each of the three algorithms was run on eight distinct synthetic traces of a specific bit-rate SNR, and the resulting mean values are plotted in Fig. 7 along with error bars representing the standard deviation associated with the mean detection time for each bit-rate SNR. Notice that, as expected, the time to detection decreases as the bit-rate SNR increases. We find that the bPDM generally outperforms both the MAD and the PAD, although for lower bit-rate SNR values, its detection times are comparable to the MAD's. The spectral-based PAD consistently has the highest, though comparable, detection times. We note that we achieve these comparable or better detection times, in the case of fixed-size constant-rate attacks, without the drawbacks of the other methods, as described in Sections I and II (see Table III ). For the case of the smart attacker (see Section V-E), the detection times for the bPDM can be considerably longer.
D. Validating the bPDM's Need for Only Minimal Training
The previous section showed that the bPDM outperforms the MAD, PAD, and entropy-based Feinstein schemes. In this section, we further explain two important advantages of the bPDM: Fig. 7 . Comparing the time to detection (in milliseconds) for the bPDM, MAD, and PAD detection algorithms using the set of simulated synthetic TCP SYN attacks that employ 68-byte packets.
It requires limited training, and its model parameters automatically update in an online fashion, as compared to other existing schemes.
The MAD (see Section V-C for details) requires a training period of 10-12 s or more and flags both marked changes in the level of background traffic and actual attacks as attacks since the increase in traffic volume is captured by updating only the attack parameter. In contrast, the bPDM uses the generalized Poisson distribution with two varying parameters to account for changes in the level of background traffic. The attack parameter , as in the case of the MAD, updates as in (14) and is compared to the background to identify the presence of an anomaly. Importantly, in the bPDM, the packet-size SPRT is incorporated in addition to the packet-rate SPRT to ensure that an increase in traffic volume without a corresponding change in the packet-size distribution is not flagged as an attack (see Section IV-C and Fig. 2 for details) . We note that even if the packet-size SPRT had likewise been incorporated into the MAD to reduce false alarms, the static nature of the background parameter would still necessitate a minimum 10-12-s training period for the MAD, while the bPDM only requires 2-3 s. Furthermore, our experimental results suggest that the bPDM requires only 2-3 s of background traffic irrespective of the attack strength.
The second detection scheme to be considered, the PAD, also requires a longer period of training data than the bPDM, which it uses to characterize the spectral-domain features of normal background-only traffic. In the testing phase, the presence of frequency-domain components that were not present in the background-only traffic spectrum is used to detect attacks. We note that the PAD is sensitive to significant changes in the background traffic, and thus the data used to train the algorithm must be statistically similar to those used to test it. This is not the case for the bPDM, which initializes using a limited amount of training data, and then automatically updates its parameters as the network traffic evolves.
The MNA-CUSUM is a nonparametric sequential algorithm developed by Tartakovsky et al. [32] , which requires a nontrivial amount of overhead when initially deployed: It filters incoming packets by size and uses individual channels and decision statistics (analogous to the log-likelihood ratio in the SPRT) to detect an attack rapidly. Because the decision statistics are based on score functions that update periodically using a parameter update method similar to that of the bPDM for each of the channels, the initial deployment of the MNA-CUSUM involves hand-tuning of the thresholds of each channel to meet the false-alarm requirements. An alternative to the hand-tuning of thresholds could be an explicit search over the parameter space, which has not been implemented in [32] , but would presumably be computationally intensive due to the multiple channels employed. Recall that the bPDM is initially deployed with no hand-tuning since the initial parameter estimates are automatically computed using (12) , given a limited amount of background-only training data.
Thus, our algorithm requires only up to 2-3 s of training data, as compared to the 10-12 s needed by the MAD and PAD, since the and update window sizes are 1 s long as described in Section IV. Also, unlike MNA-CUSUM, our algorithm requires only a few parameters and performs automatic training. Thus, we find that the bPDM's use of limited training data and automatic updating of its model parameters in real time results in its being free from the drawbacks of other existing detection methods.
E. Robustness of the bPDM to a Smart Attacker
As described in previous sections, the bPDM uses the packet size both as a feature for detection and to reduce false positives. We now consider the smart adversary scenario, wherein the attacker constructs an attack whose distribution of packet sizes attempts to match that of the background traffic. For this purpose, we create a set of smart adversary synthetic attacks wherein the attack stream uses a constant bit rate, but with a distribution of packet sizes that is drawn from the bimodal distribution described in [27] . We recall that the packet-size distribution of nominal Internet traffic has been characterized in [27] as mostly bimodal, a result validated by an examination of our background trace data. For any given data rate corresponding to a bit-rate SNR, the smart attack is generated by combining 40% 68-byte packets, 20% 1518-byte packets, and a uniform distribution of the remaining 40% of packets in the interval (68,1518) bytes since the smart attacker is not privy to the exact (and evolving) distribution of packet sizes in background traffic at the detector's location. Though attackers do not use this approach today, as in general they cannot perfectly guess the packet-size distribution on the monitored link, we present these smart attacks to consider one possible set of countermeasures against our detection mechanism.
It must be noted that although the smart adversary actively manipulates only the packet-size distribution, the smart attacks affect both the packet-rate and the packet-size aspects of the bPDM.
1) The packet sizes used by a smart adversary are drawn from a bimodal distribution that resembles normal Internet traffic. This results in the entropy of the packet-size distribution in the case of an attack being similar to that in the background-only case, reducing the effectiveness of the packet-size SPRT. 2) Recall that the synthetic TCP SYN attacks employ 68-byte packets. In drawing from a bimodal distribution, the smart adversary uses a range of packets, including several that are larger than 68 bytes. This variety of packet sizes implies that for a fixed attack rate, say 60 Mb/s, the smart attack has a smaller number of packets per second than a TCP SYN attack. This should challenge the packet-rate SPRT employed by the bPDM. Despite these challenges, we will see that the bPDM can still detect attacks from a smart adversary. Fig. 8(a) shows the bPDM detection times for the smart, denoted "bPDM(smart)," and TCP SYN, denoted "bPDM(SYN)," simulated attacks as a function of the bit-rate SNR. We recall that the (SYN) label refers to the set of synthetic TCP SYN traces wherein fixed 68-byte packets are employed; correspondingly, the (smart) label denotes packets drawn from the bimodal packet-size distribution. In particular, the bPDM algorithm was run on eight synthetic TCP SYN and smart traces each, all of a specific bit-rate SNR. The mean detection times are plotted in Fig. 8(a) , wherein the error bars represent the standard deviation of the detection times. We find that the bPDM successfully detects the synthetic smart attacks, albeit with longer detection times than for the TCP SYN attacks.
Since the smart attacker employs the bimodal distribution of traffic, the sample entropy due to the packet sizes that correspond to the two means of the bimodal distribution does not change appreciably after the attack. On the other hand, the 40% of packets that have sizes that are uniformly distributed do not precisely model the true distribution of packet sizes of background traffic, and thus there is a measurable difference in sample entropy that enables the bPDM to detect the smart attacks. We now consider a smart attacker that generates a "smarter" attack that more closely matches the two most common packet sizes and further incorporates the third (denoted smart2), and then the fourth (denoted smart3), most common (modal) packet sizes when designing the attack packet-size distribution. In this scenario, the original smart attack matches 58% of traffic, and the smart2 and smart3 attacks consist of 71% and 78% matched traffic, respectively. Fig. 9 shows the packet-rate SPRT (subplot 1) and the packetsize SPRT for increasingly smarter attacks (subplots 2-4). Note that the packet-rate SPRT rapidly crosses the upper threshold for these attacks with bit-rate SNRs of 0.3, whereas the packetsize SPRT takes longer since the attack packet size distribution Fig. 9 . Comparing the packet-size LLRs for increasingly "smarter" attacks. Subplots 2-4 employ smart attacks that comprise 58%, 71%, and 78% matched traffic, respectively. more closely resembles that of background traffic. In the case of the "smarter" attack, wherein 58% of the traffic is matched by the attacker (corresponding to an empirical symmetric Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence [11] of 14.21 with respect to the background), the bPDM time to detection is 770 ms (averaged over eight simulations). As the percentage of matched traffic increases, so does the time to detection. For the smart2 attack, wherein 71% of the traffic is matched (empirical symmetric KL divergence of 9.42), the time to detection for the bPDM is 1500 ms (averaged over eight simulations). When 78% of the traffic is matched (empirical symmetric KL divergence of 7.33), as in the case of the smart3 attack, the BPDM cannot detect the smart attacker. Even for the smart3 attack, the packet-rate SPRT rapidly crosses the upper threshold at the onset of the attack (as in Fig. 9, subplot 1) , but an attack is never declared since the packet-size SPRT never crosses the upper threshold. Thus, although the packet-size SPRT significantly reduces false positives (especially in the case of fixed-size, constant-rate attacks), in the case of "smarter" attacks, it is responsible for false negatives. The consideration of the set of "smarter" attacks further characterizes the performance limitations of the bPDM. As seen in Section V-A.1, the bPDM cannot detect attacks with bit-rate SNRs lower than 0.02, and we now conclude that attacks with packet-size distributions that comprise roughly 80% or more matched traffic are also missed by the bPDM.
The bPDM's inability to detect attacks with packet-size distributions that closely match that of the background traffic is also relevant in the case of open-loop versus closed-loop TCP flows. Since open-loop TCP flows exhibit greater traffic variability than closed-loop TCP flows [25] , we would expect the packet-size distribution of the latter to resemble that of background traffic more closely than that of the former. In general, this would result in increased detection times for the bPDM for 
F. Bit-Rate SNR Versus Packet SNR
An alternative metric, the packet SNR, is used by He et al. [16] to evaluate their methods. In this section, we compare the packet SNR to the bit-rate SNR, and we find that the latter is a more effective measure of anomaly strength for this application. The packet SNR is defined as [16] (22) where , and are as defined for (20) . This metric is thus defined in terms of the packet rates of both the attack and the background traffic, rather than the bit rate (in megabits/second) as in the case of the bit-rate SNR.
Both the packet and bit-rate SNRs are equivalent metrics for the TCP SYN attacks, described in Section V-C, in that the relative times to detection for different schemes-e.g., bPDM, MAD, PAD-are identical for both metrics. For example, the bPDM detects TCP SYN attacks faster than the other methods irrespective of the metric used for comparison. This equivalency exists for any anomalies that employ fixed-size packets. To compare the metrics' efficacy in this case, we revisit Fig. 7 in Section V-C as Fig. 10 , this time employing the packet SNR instead of the bit-rate SNR. The times to detection for the three methods, averaged over eight sets of synthetic TCP SYN attacks, are plotted as a function of packet SNR in Fig. 10 , with error bars representing the standard deviation of the detection times. In comparing Figs. 7 and 10, we note that they are simply scaled and shifted versions of each other, which shows that the packet SNR is equivalent to the bit-rate SNR in the case of attacks with fixed-size packets.
However, this is not always the case; we now consider an attack due to a smart adversary, as introduced in Section V-E. We compare Fig. 8(a) to 8(b) , wherein the bPDM times to detection are plotted for the smart and TCP SYN synthetic attacks as a function of bit-rate SNR and packet SNR, respectively. Note that in Fig. 8(b) the smart adversary attacks are detected more quickly than the corresponding TCP SYN attacks. This is a very counterintuitive result since, as described above, the smart adversary represents a set of countermeasures against our detection mechanism. In contrast, in Fig. 8(a) , the TCP SYN attacks are shown to be detected markedly and uniformly faster than the smart adversary attacks for the entire range of bit-rate SNR values, which is the result we expect.
Given that both metrics are equivalent in the case of attacks that use fixed-size attack packets, but that the packet SNR yields a counterintuitive result in the case of the smart adversary, we conclude that the bit-rate SNR is an effective metric for comparison and evaluation and is better than the packet SNR.
G. Validation of Synthetic Attacks
In order to confirm the conclusions drawn from the bPDM's performance on simulated attacks, here we test the bPDM using three real network attacks captured in the wild and available through PREDICT and three proxy-real attacks consisting of real denial-of-service attacks (DoS) and real background traffic streams combined using Stream Merger [21] . We find that the detection times for the real and proxy-real attacks closely resemble those of the synthetic attacks.
Though the three real network attacks considered were collected in varying network conditions, all six attacks employ either 15-, 60-, or 68-byte fixed-size attack packets. In this respect, they resemble the set of synthetic TCP SYN attacks. Thus, we expect the detection times for the real attacks to resemble those for the SYN attacks. Table IV summarizes the attack details; the bit-rate SNRs for the real attacks range from 0.012 to 0.53, with varying attack and background traffic levels (in megabits/second).
The detection times for the individual real and proxy-real attacks are plotted (as open, unconnected symbols) in Fig. 11 for comparison to the detection times for the synthetic traces of the bPDM, MAD, and PAD detection schemes. As in earlier plots, the points for the synthetic traces [i.e., bPDM(SYN), bPDM(smart), MAD(SYN), and PAD(SYN)] represent the mean detection times, with the error bars providing the standard deviation. The bPDM detection times for the real and proxy-real network attacks as shown in Fig. 11 were obtained by running the algorithm on the attacks with 2-3 s of background traffic before the onset of the attack. Furthermore, the plot of the detection times for the synthetic TCP SYN attacks has been extrapolated (as indicated by a dashed black line) to compare the TCP SYN detection times to those for the real ip-proto 255 and UDP Servpath attacks. Of the models considered, the best fit for the synthetic TCP SYN detection times was found to be an exponential one, which is described as . For all real and proxy-real attacks, we see that a higher bit-rate SNR corresponds to a lower time to detection, and further note that the actual (and extrapolated) detection times for the synthetic TCP SYN attacks are consistent with the times to detection for the real and proxy-real network attacks.
H. Considering the Effect of Hop Count on Time to Detection
Recall that Fig. 5 in Section V-A.1 shows that the detection times for the synthetic TCP SYN attacks are consistently lower than the averaged Iperf detection times, described in Section V-A.1 and V-A.2, respectively.
We believe this disparity is due to the shorter path for our synthetic TCP attacks: Our synthetic TCP SYN attacks are constructed by mixing traffic using Stream Merger, so the attack traverses the equivalent of one hop. In contrast, the emulated Iperf attacks from CSU to USC must traverse the 8-10 hops over the real Internet (as measured by traceroute; see [34, Appendix A] ), and at each hop through a router, cross-traffic from other applications can distort the attack. Although this conjecture is consistent with the data, its verification in a controlled experiment is an area for future work.
I. Controlling the Probability of False Positives
As discussed in Section III, the SPRT allows control over the probability of false positives via tunable parameters and , which directly affect the SPRT thresholds and . To examine the effect of these parameters on the probability of false positives, we employ a set of 24 background traffic traces [2] , each 5 min long, gathered every hour for 24 h. Fig. 12(a) shows the number of false positives declared by the bPDM for different values of , and Fig. 12(a) shows the bit rate (in megabits/second) as a function of time of day for a 24-h period. As expected, the number of false positives increases as increases, which is equivalent to lowering the upper threshold of the SPRT. Furthermore, we see that the number of false positives declared by the bPDM is not correlated with the level of the background traffic, implying that the bPDM is fairly robust against variations in the background traffic. For the bPDM simulations using the simulated synthetic, emulated Iperf and real traces, we use and and note that false positives are reduced to zero, which corresponds to the plot in Fig. 12 .
VI. CONCLUSION We have developed the bivariate Parametric Detection Mechanism (bPDM), which can detect anomalies and low-rate attacks in a few seconds. This approach allows the real-time estimation of model parameters and only requires 2-3 s of background-only traffic for training. Incorporating the packet-rate and packet-size features enables us to detect anomalies in encrypted traffic and avoid state-intensive flow tracking since our method does not use flow-separated traffic; furthermore, combining these same two features also eliminates most false positives. We have evaluated our methods using synthetic traces and emulated Iperf attacks, and find that the bPDM can detect attacks in a few seconds. The detection times for the synthetic attacks are validated using real and proxy-real network attacks, and the bit-rate SNR is shown to be not only an effective metric for evaluating anomaly detection methods, but also a better one than the previously proposed packet SNR metric. For all the data sets considered, as well as the underlying theoretical model, we find that the time to detection decreases as the bit-rate SNR increases. Furthermore, we examine the effect of the individual components of the bit-rate SNR on the time to detection, and find that as the attack rate increases, the detection time decreases, and as background traffic level increases, the time to detection decreases.
